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The Need for an American Industrial Policy
I. INTRODUCTION
In the years following World War 11, the American economy enjoyed unparalleled and often unchallenged success. American companies were leaders in virtually every important manufacturing and technological industry. In part because of the
war-time devastation of the Japanese and European economies,
American corporations dominated a wide range of important
industries including steel, automobiles, aviation and textiles. In
addition, America was most often the pioneer in important new
technologies. The success of American business and industry at
home and abroad translated into relatively high-paying jobs for
American workers and one of the highest standards of living in
the world.
The economic dominance that America once enjoyed, however, has rapidly diminished over the last few decades. Many of
the industries which American corporations once dominated
have now become the almost exclusive domain of foreign competitors. There are now virtually no American producers of
such consumer electronic goods as televisions, VCRs,
camcorders, and compact disc players. American industries
which produce many other important products have been continually losing market share and are themselves in danger of
following the American consumer electronics industry into
extinction. The General Accounting Office (GAO) recently found
that during the 1980s American companies lost ground to foreign competitors in ten of eleven high technology sectors, including telecommunications equipment, fiber optics, semiconductors, robotics and supercomputers.'
Numerous reasons exist for America's inability to compete
with foreign companies in so many important industries. Part
of the blame can certainly be laid on the complacency and inefficiency of American businesses themselves. However, many
other factors beyond the control of American private businesses
have also contributed to America's industrial decline. This
comment focuses on some of these factors and analyzes how

1.

Bentsen Asks for Action; GAO Finds US. High Tech Is Slipping, COMM.

DAILY, Nov. 20, 1992, at 3.
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they have threatened and continue to threaten America's industrial and economic health. This comment also examines
several measures which may be taken to strengthen America's
industrial position. Although much of the burden' of solving
America's industrial and manufacturing problems must rest
with American private industry, this paper focuses primarily
on several government policies, the adoption of which could
help reverse the trend of manufacturing and industrial decline
in the United States.
INDUSTRIAL POLICY
11. THE NEEDFOR A LIMITED

A. Industrial Policy Defined
The notion that government might intervene in the marketplace to aid and encourage domestic businesses is often referred t o as "industrial policy." Although the term "industrial
policy" means different things to different people, for purposes
of this paper industrial policy is defined as government assistance to "aid[] industry by helping to develop critical technologies and by providing fertile conditions for the industries of
tomorrow t o grow.'"
B. Tensions Between Industrial Policy and
Free Market Theory
Despite the decline of many important industries over the
past few years, the U.S.government has generally been reluctant to intervene in the market to assist troubled domestic
businesses because of its adherence to free trade economic
theory. Instead, the government has traditionally preferred to
rely on market forces to determine which domestic industries
will expand and which will contract. Free market theorists
argue that if a nation is losing a particular industry to a foreign competitor, it is because foreign producers have a comparative advantage in that industry relative to domestic produce r ~ Government
.~
aid to certain businesses or industries, it is
2.
Steven Greenhouse, The Calls for an Industrial Policy Grow Louder, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 1992, Q 3, at 5.
3.
According to free trade theory, differences in climate, natural resources,
culture and skills give each country a comparative advantage in the production of
certain kinds of goods and a relative disadvantage in the production of others.
Paul R. Krugman, Introduction: New Thinking About Trade Pdicy, in STRATEGIC
TRADEPOLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
7 (Paul R. Krugman ed.,
1986).
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argued, only subsidizes comparatively inefficient industries
that cannot succeed by themselves and therefore do not deserve
to survive. If a domestic producer cannot compete against a foreign competitor, then according to free market economic theory,
the domestic producer's resources would be better allocated in
another industry. Accordingly, proponents of free trade theory
are generally opposed to government intervention in the market to assist domestic businesses.

C. Why the United States Can No Longer Afford
to Be Without an Industrial Policy
Although the government's traditional hands-off relationship with industry has generally been successful in the past, it
is clear that this policy does not always work well today. Perhaps it would still work if all countries adhered to the same
practice. However, not all countries intend t o confine government to a more or less passive role in the marketplace. In fact,
most of America's major competitors practice some form of
overt industrial policy.
Japan, with its Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), is an excellent example of a nation with an active
industrial policy. MITI's mission is simply "to advance the wellbeing of the Japanese people through rapid economic g r o ~ t h . " ~
MITI seeks to accomplish its objective by "changCing1 the industrial structure by placing it in accordance with world markets
and competitive forces driven by advancing te~hnology."~
Rather than ignoring the realities of the market, MITI "shapes and
alters market forces and accepts the market's judgments of the
success or failure of [its] initiative^."^ Japan seeks to channel
resources t o strategic industries with proven or great potential
market value by "encourag[ingI their development through
grants [and] subsidized in~estment."~
Japan has also employed
various protectionist measures to help certain fledgling industries gain a foothold in the market. Although Japan's industrial
policies have produced some notable failures, they have also
helped create successful industries in a number of areas which

4.

WILUAM S. DIETRICH, THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN:THE POLITICAL

ROOTS OF

AMERICAN ECONOMIC DECLINE116 (1991).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 117.
7. R.C. Longworth, Experts Agree Government Must Help to Save Computer
Industry, CHI.TRIB., M a y 20, 1992, $ 1, at 12.
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would likely have never come into existence if left entirely to
market forces.'
The Europeans have also employed industrial policies to
help important industries become more competitive in the
world market. Europe's Airbus Industrie is one example of how
foreign industrial policies have hurt American competitors.
This four-nation aircraft consortiumg "has badly bruised
McDonnell-Douglas and has become Boeing's main challenger
thanks to an estimated $20 billion in aid from European

government^."'^
The loss or decline of certain American industries is thus
not simply the result of other nations having a natural comparative advantage. Rather, it is often the result of foreign industrial policies which have targeted those industries. Dr. Allan
Bromley, the science advisor to President Bush, warned that
without government programs to aid American high tech industries "we will not only cease to establish the frontiers of knowledge, but we will be so far behind we won't even be players
anymore."ll

D. The Rationale for Limited Government
Participation in the Market
Despite the widespread belief in the United States that
government should not interfere in the market, many economists have recognized that some cases exist in which government interference is justified. These include situations where
promotion of an industry is necessary for purposes of national
defense, or where an "infant" industry needs protection for a
few years to enable it to compete against more established
foreign industries. l2
Some economists have also recently argued that government participation in the market may be justified to assist
industries that produce "external economies" for the nation in

R. NESTER,JAPANESE
INDUSTRIAL
TARGETING:THE NEOMERCAN8. WILLIAM
SUPERPOWER
22, 38 (1991).
TILIST PATHTO ECONOMIC
The countries supporting Airbus are France, Germany, Spain and the Unit9.
ed Kingdom.
10.
Greenhouse, supra note 2, at 5.
11. Peter G. Gosselin, In High Tech, Mergers Outpace US Policy, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 19, 1992, at 1, 14.
12. See ADAM SM~TH,THE WEALTHOF NATIONS429-39 (Edwin Cannan ed.,
E . CAVES& RONALD
W. JONES,
Modern Library 1965) (1776); see also RICHARD
26, 228-29 (4th ed. 1985).
WORLDTRADE AND PAYMENTS
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which they are located. External economies are "benefit[s] from
some activity that accrue[] to . . . individuals or funs [other]
than those engaging in the activity."13 In other words, investment in some industries "yield[s] high returns to society because in addition to their own earnings they provide benefits to
capital and labor employed elsewhere."14
From a societal perspective, the market u n d e ~ v e s t sin
industries which generate external economies because not all
the benefits of the investment go to those who make the investment. Some industries may provide a high rate of return t o the
economy at large because of the high level of external economies and yet fail to attract any private investment because the
return to private investors is so low.15 This seems to be particularly true for investments in technologies or industries which
involve very large investments, high risk, o r delayed payoffs.16 In such situations, the market may fail to direct investments to areas which would yield the highest returns to the
economy as a whole.
Two areas of the economy which generate large external
economies are high technology and manufacturing industries.
Because investors in these industries do not themselves receive
all the benefits their investments provide, they are unlikely to
invest as much in these areas as the good of society would
suggest. The following sections examine three different types of
external economies that these industries provide and the danger that their loss would cause to the U.S. economy.

1. Linkages
One way that a n industry may generate external economies is through "linkages." The premise of "linkage" is that the
health of some industries is inextricably linked to the health of
other industries. The existence of one industry in the domestic
economy may provide widespread societal benefits through the
creation of jobs in related industries. Accordingly, the success
13. Krugman, supra note 3, at 13.
14. Id. Studies of industrial research and development @&D) investments, for
example, have found "that, on average, the social rate of return is roughly twice
the private rate." CONGRESSIONALBUDGETOFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, THE BENEFITS
AND RISKSOF FEDERAL
FUNDING
FOR SEMATECH
33 (1987).
15. See OFFICE OF TECHNOMGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, MAKING THINGS
BETTER:COMPETINGIN MANUFACTURING21 (1990) [hereinafter COMPETINGIN MANUFACl'URING].

16.

Id. at 33.
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of the related industries is linked to the success of the original
industry. However, through these same linkages, the loss of
one domestic industry may have widespread negative effects on
other industries.
a. The link between manufacturing and service
jobs. Many service jobs are so tightly linked to manufacturing
that if the manufacturing processes are moved offshore, the
service jobs will follow in a very short time. The U.S. textile
industry is a good example of this type of linkage. The U.S. textile industry creates
some 15,000 to 20,000 trucking jobs, specialized in moving
and warehousing, chemicals, raw materials, yarn, cloths,
pieces of garments, and even packaging, right up to, but not
including, the completed garment (at which point imports
would have the same employment effect). Few of these roles
would exist without an onshore textilelapparel industry. The
same is obviously true for those who repair and service the
machinery used in manufacturing: in almost all cases, they
have to be located close to the machines that will need servicing. The same conditions apply to the numerous security
guards, janitors, bookkeepers, and data processors hired.''

Admittedly, many services such as advertising or retailing may
be unaffected by whether goods are manufactured domestically
or abroad; however, a great number of service jobs are lost
when manufacturing processes are moved offshore.
b. The link between manufacturing industries and "upstream" and "downstream" producers. The loss of domestic
producers of certain manufactured goods may also have a serious impact on domestic manufacturers that are "upstream" and
"downstream" in the production proces~.'~
If domestic producers of certain manufactured goods go out of business and the
production of these goods is subsequently moved offshore, the
former domestic suppliers may encounter difficulties in finding
new buyers or becoming suppliers for the new foreign manufac17.

STEPHENS. COHEN& JOHN
ZYSMAN, MANUFACTURING
MATTERS: ll~
MYTH

OF THE POST-INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY
23-24 (1987).

18. The concept of upstream and downstream linkages simply reflects the idea
that producers of end products are dependent upon suppliers for critical parts and
components. For example, computer manufacturers are dependent upon companies
that make semiconductors. Semiconductor manufacturers are in turn dependent
upon companies that produce semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Likewise,
suppliers are also dependent upon the producers of end products because suppliers
obviously cannot stay in business if there are no buyers for their products.
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turer. Given time, new suppliers will likely develop in the same
region where the end product is being manufactured, and given
the preference of many companies t o buy from suppliers in
geographical proximity and from suppliers of the same national
origin, the American suppliers would be in serious danger of
being displaced.
Similarly, if the domestic suppliers of a domestic manufacturer are displaced by foreign suppliers, the domestic manufacturer could be placed at a disadvantage v i s - h i s its foreign
competition because in many industries foreign suppliers of
component parts are also competitors in the end product. Given
this situation, once a domestic manufacturer is dependent upon
foreign suppliers, the foreign suppliers may be tempted to delay selling the most advanced products to the American manufacturer in order to give themselves an advantage in the marketplace.
The American supercomputer industry provides a good
illustration of t h i s problem. "America's remaining
supercomputer producer, Cray, is dependent on Japanese suppliers for most of its key components."lg Unfortunately, many
of these Japanese suppliers also produce supercomputers themselves or are closely aligned with other Japanese companies
that produce supercomputers. This dependence on Japanese
suppliers, who are also competitors, has often been exploited by
these suppliers. For example, "[tlhe management of Cray . . .
has at times been told that the latest and best of these components are 'not yet available for export' from Japan. They are,
however, available to Japanese supercomputer makers, and the
Japanese supercomputers themselves are ready for export."20
The same type of problem has also been encountered in other
industries, including the semiconductor industry.21
(1) The case of the U.S. semiconductor industryhow its health depends on the health of "downstream" users of
semiconductors. The semiconductor industry demonstrates the
importance of upstream and downstream linkages. A semiconductor is a silicon chip upon which thousands of electronic

19.
NESTER,
supra note 8, at 200.
20.
COMPETING IN ~ A C T U R I N G supm
,
note 15, at 15-16.
21.
Office of Technology Assessment Report "Competing in Manufacturing": Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, lOlst Cong.,
2d Sess. 124-25 (1990) [hereinafter OTA Report] (statement of Sanford L. Kane,
former president, U.S. Memories).
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circuits are fabricated. Semiconductors are "the foundation on
which computers, office automation products (such as copiers,
fax machines, and word processors), consumer electronics, robots, telecommunications equipment, and many other technologically advanced industries are
The loss of the
American domestic semiconductor market would be devastating
to the American economy. The world market for semiconductors
in 1991 was $66 billion.23 In addition, the world market for
electronic products, t o which semiconductors are crucial, exceeded $650 billion in 1989.24The electronics industry is currently "the biggest employer in America, providing more jobs
than the auto, aerospace and steel industries c~mbined.'"~
The technology for semiconductors was originally developed
and refined in the United States, and the United States was
the undisputed leader in basic semiconductor technology until
However, by 1991 the Japanese had captured
the 1nid-1980s.~~
52% of the worldwide market for semiconductor^.^' At the
same time, the United States saw its semiconductor market
share drop from 60% in 1980 to 35% in 1991.28Four of the top
five producers of semiconductors are now Japane~e.~'
Part of the problem for U.S. semiconductor makers is that
a large portion of the downstream users of semiconductors are
foreign manufacturers. Because the Japanese are leading producers of products which use large amounts of semiconductors
(such as consumer electronics and automobiles), it is not surprising that Japan, rather than the United States, is the
world's leading buyer of semiconductor^.^^
According to free trade theory, the nationality of the end
users of semiconductors should not matter to U.S. semiconductor producers. Buyers of semiconductors should buy their chips
from whomever produces the highest quality chip at the lowest
price regardless of national origin. However, the reality of the

DIETRICH, supra note 4, at 26.
See Neil Gross et al., Making Deals-Without Giving Away the Store, Bus.
WK., June 17, 1991, at 96, 96.
DIETRICH, supra note 4, at 26.
24.
REP.,Apr.
25.
David Gergen, America as a Techno-Colony, U.S. NEWS& WORLD
1, 1991, at 88, 88.
DIETRICH, supra note 4, at 26.
26.
Gergen, supra note 25, at 88.
27.
Gross et al., supm note 23, at 96.
28.
Id.
29.
30.
In 1991, Japanese chip buyers purchased an estimated 40% of the world's
semiconductors compared with an estimated 28% for the United States. Id. at 98.

22.
23.
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world marketplace is an entirely different matter. Although the
Japanese market accounts for 40% of worldwide semiconductor
demand, Japanese firms bought only 12.3% of their semiconductors from American manufacturers in 1990, up from 8.5% in
1985.31That this purchasing pattern is not simply due to poor
quality or high prices of American semiconductors is supported
by the fact that American producers have 66% of the American
automobile market in semiconductors, and more importantly by
the fact that American producers of semiconductors have 56%
of the European market-a presumably neutral ground.32
Another reason that American companies cannot sell semiconductors (and many other products) in Japan is that Japanese companies, motivated in part by nationalistic sentiment,
prefer to buy from Japanese suppliers.33 In fact, Japanese
companies will often buy inferior products from Japanese suppliers and then work with those suppliers to improve their
quality.34 Japanese buyers purchase "American goods and
equipment only when [a] Japanese product is not available or
until the product can be made in Japan."35 Given this reality,
an American companfs loss of market share can devastate
domestic upstream industries which supply components and
parts to that company.36
(2) The dependence of U.S.semiconductor producers
on the health of "upstream"American suppliers of semiconductor manufacturing equipment. In a somewhat similar vein, the
health of the U.S. semiconductor industry also depends upon

31.
Paul Magnusson, The New Chip Pact: This Time If11 Probably Pay Off,
Bus. WK., June 17, 1991, a t 98, 98.
32. Decline of U.S. Semiconductor Infrastructure: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, l O l s t Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1990) (testimony of Rep. Doug
Walgren).
33.
Cf Semiconductors and the Electronics Industry: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Bansportation, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1990) (statement of Peter H.
Mills, Senior Vice President, Sematech). Many American companies also admittedly
prefer to buy equipment from American suppliers when possible. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. a t 35-36 (statement of Joe Parkinson, Chairman & CEO, Micron
Technology, Inc.).
36. American producers would have a greater proportion of the world
semiconductor market open to them if American producers had remained in the
consumer electronics industry or if American automakers were able to regain some
of their lost market share. See id. a t 2 1 (statement of John A. Armstrong, Vice
President for Science and Technology, IBM Corp.).
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the success of domestic producers of semiconductor manufacturing equipment. To compete in the semiconductor market, producers must have access to state-of-the-art manufacturing
equipment. Those producers which are able to employ the most
efficient, productive and reliable manufacturing equipment will
obviously have a n advantage over those who do not or cannot.
Like the semiconductor industry itself, the U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry enjoyed a substantial lead over its competitors ten years ago. However, the domestic semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry has
suffered such severe losses to Japanese competitors that its
very survival has been questioned. In 1980, the top five semiconductor manufacturing equipment makers were U.S. compafour of the top five equipment makers were
n i e ~ By
. ~ 1990,
~
Japane~e.'~
Moreover, in 1981 American companies held 73%
of the international market for manufacturing equipment,3'
but by 1990 that share had dropped to 38%.40
This deterioration of the American semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry threatened the health of domestic
semiconductor producers by making them dependent on foreign
This would not be a
suppliers for manufacturing equi~ment.~'
serious problem if American semiconductor manufacturers
could buy the latest and best equipment from foreign suppliers
on the same terms as their foreign competitors. However, some
evidence indicates that the Japanese suppliers were intentionally delaying sales of their most advanced equipment to American f m s in order to give their Japanese competitors an advantage in the semiconductor market.42Given this sort of nationalistic behavior on the part of foreign suppliers, the continued
health of the domestic manufacturing equipment industry is
crucial to the viability of the American semiconductor industry.

37.
Proposed Foreign Acquisition of LTV Debated, 57 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA)
904, 905 (June 15, 1992).
38.. Decline of US. Semiconductor Infrastructure, supra note 32, at 71.
39.
Elizabeth Corcoran, US. Semiconductor Toolmakers Regain Ground, SCI.
AM., July 1992, at 108.
40.
John Markoff, Rethinking the National Chip Policy, N.Y. TIMES,July 14,
1992, at Dl, D6.
41.
The American semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry had deteriorated so badly by 1986 that semiconductors could not be produced using all U.S.made manufacturing equipment. Thus, American producers had to buy Japanese
equipment in order to produce semiconductors.
42.
Semiconductors and t h Electronics Industry, supra note 33, at 54 (statement of Peter H. Mills, Senior Vice President, Sematech).
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2. Infrastructure

A second way that a n industry may generate external
economies is by contributing to a nation's economic infrastructure. Certain industries are essential to a nation's economy
because they provide "critical or strategic inputs that must be
available as infrastructure to the rest of the economy.'"43 Industries such as steel and semiconductors, for example, are
essential to the existence and growth of many other related
ind~stries.~~
Other industries are critical to the U.S. economic infrastructure because of the knowledge and skills they provide to
American workers. Science-based industries, for example, are
critical because they "play a role akin to that of universities in
building and preserving the nation's stock of human capital-that is, both scientific and engineering knowledge and the
ability to expand it."45This infrastructure is essential to the
success of small, high technology, entrepreneurial companies
which are often seen as one of America's greatest economic
strengths. These "niche" companies do not generally come into
existence without a supporting foundation. Rather, "most of the
leading entrepreneurial companies were started by men who
learned their trade in the laboratories and on the production
~~
these companies
lines of larger ~ o m p a n i e s . ' Furthermore,
cannot continue to "survive without an infrastructure in which
they assume specific roles and from which they draw talent,
expertise, components, equipment and a market. . . . [Tlhey
must operate in an environment that provides them the support they need.""
The existence of domestic industries in certain areas is also
critical because "the future growth and technological development of a nation is moulded by the current composition of its
' ~ ~ high technology products and
industries and a c t i v i t i e ~ . The
industries of the future are often developed by applying new
technologies and improvements to existing products.49 If the
43.
John Zysman, Trade, Technology and National Competition, 7 I m J . TECH.
MGMT.161, 162 (1992).
NE~ER
supra
,
note 8, at 16.
44.
45.
CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGETOFFICE, supra note 14, at xviii.
46.
OTA Report, supra note 21, at 123 (statement of Sanford L. Kane, former
president, U.S.Memories).
Id.
47.
48.
Zysman, supra note 43, at 164.
In addition, innovations that lead to new products or that greatly improve
49.
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products of today are no longer produced by American compa?nies, the scientific o r technological breakthroughs which are
made in the United States may not translate into substantial
benefits for the U.S. economy. The absence of domestic companies in industries which can actually apply new technological
breakthroughs to commercially viable products causes the technology to be sold to foreign companies which can use it.50 Accordingly, the additional investment, profits and job creation
which new technologies make possible may not be realized by
the United States, but by other countries.
Government assistance to industry may sometimes be
necessary because individual American firms are generally not
concerned about whether their decision to abandon a particular
industry will hurt the national economic infrastructure. Individual American firms operate under the notion of opportunity
cost. If they are able to make more money by abandoning an
industry and concentrating in another, they will do so.51 In
Japan, by contrast, the opposite approach is taken. "[Tlhe Japanese feel that t o abandon a product or market means the potential loss of other related products and markets and, therefore, the loss of valuable infrastr~cture."~~
3. Spillovers

A third way that a n industry may generate external economies occurs through the process of "spillover," in which
"[tlechnological knowledge in one sector or activity. . . providers] the basis for innovation in another."53 In other words,
the lessons learned in developing and making products which
are considered "technology drivers," such as semiconductors or
high-definition television (HDTV), are applicable to other industries." The consumer electronics business, for example,
existing products oRen occur not in a scientific laboratory but on the factory floor.
The factory floor is itself a laboratory where incremental improvements and advances are made which may lead to new products. If the factory floor no longer
exists on domestic soil, it is extremely =cult to develop a domestic capability in
the next-generation products which use related but more advanced technology.
50.
See Acceleration of US. Technology Utilization and Commercialization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and Competitiueness of the House Comm.
on Science, Space, and Technology, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1991) (statement of
Richard J. Elkus, Jr., Chairman, Prometrix Corp.).
51.
Id. at 61-62.
52.
Id.
53.
Zysman, supm note 43, at 165.
54.
OTA Report, supra note 21, at 125 (statement of Sanford L. Kane, former
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has become an increasingly important source of technological
spillovers because the technologies used in these products are
converging with those used in computers and other business
products.55 America's virtual absence from the consumer electronics industry has put American firms at a disadvantage in
the development of new products, especially in the area of computers and business products.56 This is because foreign firms
are able to use the technology and experience gained from producing consumer electronics products to gain an advantage in
these other related industries.
For example, firms in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan adapted the
superior CRTs [cathode ray tubes1 they developed for television to computers, and took a large share of that CRT mark e t . . . . Canon used its expertise in optics, developed in producing consumer cameras, to help in gaining its present eminence in photocopiers. Perhaps most important, Japanese
firms producing consumer products such as VCRs gained
experience with automated production lines which they are
now applying to the manufacture of computers.57

Although the exact level of spillovers generated by an industry is impossible to predict, certain technologies hold such
great promise and such potential widespread application that
their development merits government support. Some of the
underlying technologies for HDTV, such as flat panel liquid
crystal displays, are possible candidates for such support.58
Innovations and developments in HDTV technology are likely
to have application to computers, telecommunications, medical
imaging, education, and p~blishing.~'In addition, HDTV is
likely t o "push advances in manufacturing processes" which
may be applicable to other areas of the electronics industry.60
Knowledge of manufacturing process technology for HDTV
could help U.S. companies become more competitive by helping
them to improve manufacturing processes for other products.

president, US. Memories).
55.
COMPETING
IN ~~ANUFACTURING,
supm note 15, at 84.
56.
See id.
57.
Id.
58.
See id. at 85-89.
See id. at 80-85.
59.
Id. at 83.
60.
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For many years the United States has had a limited and
unspoken industrial policy. However, in order for American
companies t o be internationally competitive, the US. government needs to take a more active role t o promote the health
and growth of American industries. The goal of a US. industrial policy should be to enhance the economic prosperity of its
citizens by helping to create and to maintain high value-added
jobs for American workers. Because high value-added jobs are
found in the manufacturing and high technology industries, one
important objective of an American industrial policy should be
to adopt policies that encourage the growth and enhance the
competitiveness of these industries. The following sections
examine three strategies that the US. government could employ to achieve these objectives.

A. Government-Industry Consortia
One strategy frequently employed by other nations as a
part of their overall industrial policy is an effort to bring government and industry together to collaborate on important
projects. This effort often takes the form of governmentsponsored cooperation between competitors in the same industry in "pre-competitive research and development." This cooperation allows competing companies to avoid duplicating research
in pre-competitive areas and helps them to stretch their research and development budgets further than otherwise possible. Such cooperation also enables companies in an important
industry to engage in expensive and risky, but potentially profitable, research projects that no individual company could afford to undertake alone.
This type of government-sponsored consortium has the
potential to help American companies compete in a number of
industries. Consortia may be particularly helpful in high tech
industries where technology advances rapidly and where American companies already spend four t o five times as much on
research and development (R&D) as other manufacturing companies. The United States already has a prototype program,
known as the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Consortium, or Sematech, after which other programs could, be
modeled.
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1. Sematech as an example of a successful governmentsponsored consortium
Sematech is a manufacturing technology consortium consisting of the federal government and eleven companies which
produce semiconductors or semiconductor manufacturing equipmenL6*At the time of Sematech's creation in 1987, both the
semiconductor and the semiconductor manufacturing equipment industries were in serious trouble due to intense Japa~~
American suppliers of semiconducnese c ~ m p e t i t i o n .Critical
tor manufacturing equipment had fallen far behind the Japanese and were dropping out of the industry.63 American producers of semiconductors had become dependent upon Japanese
suppliers for their manufacturing equipment, "and they feared
that they would not have reliable access to the latest and most
efficient models-jeopardizing the whole chip industry's ability
to compete.'*4
Administered under the guidance of the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Sematech was created with
the goal of returning technological and manufacturing superiority in the semiconductor industry back to the United States.
Sematech's approach was to reduce the R&D burden on member companies by pooling their resources and those of the federal government to conduct joint research in pre-competitive
techn~logies.~~
The consortium focuses on "areas that offer
industry-wide benefit without providing new product technology with which members can directly compete."66 The federal
government contributes $100 million annually to the consortium, an amount that is matched by the eleven member companie~.~'

61. The consortium began in 1987 with 14 participants from private industry.
Three of these original members (Micron Technology Corp., Harris Semicondudor,
and LSI Logic) have since withdrawn from the consortium because of a lack of
common goals.
62. Between 1983 and 1989 the industry lost more than $4 billion and 25,000
jobs. Thomas McCarmll, Chips Ahoy!, TIME, Nov. 23, 1992, a t 62, 62.
63. James Flanigan, US. Semiconductor Industry Rebounds from Hard Rnocks,
L.A. Trms, Od. 4, 1992, at Dl, D5.
64. When Znclustrial Policy Works, WASH.
POST,Aug. 29, 1992, at A18.
65. Flanigan, supra note 63, at D5.
66. Peter Burrows, Consortia: Are They Getting Better?, ELECTRONIC
BUS., May
18, 1992, at 47, 49.
67. Semiconductors and the Electronics Industry, supra note 33, at 56 (statement of Peter H. Mills, Senior Vice President, Sematech). The leveraging effect of
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Because of the perilously weak position of the manufacturing equipment industry and the dependence of US. semiconductor producers on foreign suppliers of manufacturing equipment, Sematech's first objective was to restore the health of the
manufacturing equipment industry. Sematech sought t o "rebuild a U.S. capability a t every step of the semiconductor pro~ ~pursuit of this goal, Sematech has enduction [ p r o ~ e s s l . "In
tered into more than fdty partnerships with forty-five American companies designed to improve the technology and reliability of U.S. manufacturing equipment." Sematech has also
worked to improve the manufacturing equipment industry ''by
pinpointing areas of technical discontinuities and engineering
problems, rather than developing specific products or manufacturing processes."70 Consequently, the biggest benefits t o the
industry have come not through great leaps in technology, but
rather through incremental improvements in equipment and
manufacturing technique^.^'
Some quantifiable evidence suggests that these efforts are
helping to make U S . equipment manufacturers more efficient.
For example, as a result of Sematech's efforts,
ATEQ cut a year off development of a laser mask writer. LAM
Research cut development costs 33% on an ECR machine for
laying down dielectric. Working with six Sematech members,
GCA Corp. improved the mean-time-between-failure of a new
wafer stepper from 150 hours to more than 800 hours, making it competitive with Japan's best."'

In addition, "NCR Corp. said new technology was introduced
into its manufacturing process nine to 12 months sooner as a
result of Sematech's programs."73 Sematech will also save the
industry millions of dollars through its development of "a chem-

the federal spending is even greater because when Sematech works with suppliers
of important manufacturing equipment, the supplier puts in three dollars for every
dollar that Sematech invests in the project. Id. at 65-66.
68.
Longworth, supra note 7, at 12.
69.
Peter Burrows, Bill Spencer Struggles to Reform Sematech, ELECTRONIC
Bus., May 18, 1992, at 57, 60.
70.
Sematech Consortium Head Says U.S. Must Solve Its Own Problems, Stop
Blaming Japan, BNA INT'L TRADE
DAILY,Feb. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, World
Library, BNAITD File.
71.
See Burrows, supra note 66, at 49-50.
72.
Burrows, supra note 69, at 60.
73.
Daniel Southerland, Sematech's Critical Juncture: Hailed as Success, Chip
PO=, Aug. 28, 1992, at B1, B2.
Consortium Faces Budget Cuts, WASH.
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ical reclamation program, which reprocesses sulfuric acid" and
results in "minimal disposal requirements and reduced environmental hazards."74
Although less tangible, one of Sematech's most important
accomplishments is instilling a greater spirit of cooperation
between makers of manufacturing equipment and the companies who actually use such equipment. As one analyst has
observed, "the once-warlike relations between chip makers and
A GAO
equipment makers are [now] far more c~operative."~~
report noted that "some Sematech initiatives emulate Japanese
practices by working with key suppliers to develop the next
~ a result, "[tlhe big
generation of e q ~ i p m e n t . " ~As
semiconductor companies are now developing long-term relationships with their suppliers instead of regarding them as
potential competitor^."^^
Similarly, Sematech has helped foster greater cooperation
between competitors in the pre-competitive stage. Sematech
has "developed lower-cost methods of chip manufacturing by
creating computer models that simulate semiconductor assembly lines. And it has devised uniform testing guidelines for
equipment to replace the hodgepodge of standards set by different chipmakers."78 I n addition, Sematech member Intel points
out that they now share all of their "internal methodologies for
characterizing, qualifymg, and debugging [their] e q ~ i p r n e n t . " ~ ~
During its first five years, Sematech has been instrumental
in helping reverse the fortunes of the US. semiconductor industry. For the first time in almost a decade, U.S. makers of
semiconductor manufacturing equipment actually saw their
world market share increase in 1991 to 41%, up from 38% in
1990.80 "This increase represented jobs generated in the
United States, or not lost, greater than the government investment in the [Sematech] e~periment."~'
The improvement appears to be due largely to the efforts of

74. Semiconductors and the Electronics Industry, supra note 33, at 62 (statement of Peter H. Mills, Senior Vice President, Sematech).
Burrows, supra note 69, at 62.
Southerland, supm note 73, at B2.
When Industrial Policy Works, supra note 64, at A18.
McCarroll, supra note 62, at 63.
Burrows, supra note 69, at 62.
Markoff, supra note 40, at D6.
William J. Spencer, Technologies Need Nurturing, N.Y. ~ M E S , July 10,
at Dl, D4.
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Sematech. Some buyers of manufacturing equipment who had
previously relied on foreign suppliers have noted that the improvements in the American equipment fostered by Sematech
enabled them to buy more American equipment than they had
originally planned. Intel, for example, noted that it bought 50%
of its new equipment for a fabrication facility from U.S. producLikewise,
ers rather than the 30% it had expected to
Motorola bought over 80% of its equipment for a new fabrication facility from American sources instead of the 25% for
which it had planned.83 Robert W. Galvin, the chairman of
Sematech and the former chairman of Motorola, stated that "he
believed that if Sematech had not been created five years ago,
some American semiconductor producers that are now thriving
would be out of business today."84
2. The role of government in sponsoring consortia

Although some experiments with government-industry
consortia are now being c0nducted,8~these efforts have been
limited and only begin to tap the vast potential benefits which
may be realized from this type of cooperation. In the electronics
industry, for example, only 60 of over 20,000 companies are full
82.
Burrows, supra note 66, at 48.
83. Id.
Southerland, supra note 73, at B2.
84.
In addition to Sematech, a limited number of other consortia currently ex85.
ist. One such consortium is the Advanced Battery Consortium, consisting of the Big
Three automakers (Ford, Chrysler and General Motors) and the federal government. The consortium's purpose is to develop advanced electric-car batteries for the
future. See Donald Woutat, Big 3 U S . Auto Firms Team Up on Rey Projects, L.A.
TIMES, June 9, 1992, at Al, A10.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has also recently
proposed a new government-industry consortium to develop flat-panel displays,
which are on everybody's list of critical technologies, and for which there is currently a $5 billion market. Proposed U S . Venture Would IZy to Combat Japanese
Lead in Flat Panel Display Market, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES(BNA), Nov. 23,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, DREXEC File. The flat-panel display
consortium would be modeled &r Sematech and would be directed by members
from private industry. This proposed consortium would be an important experiment
because it would be 'designed to get a new industry going rather than to shore up
an existing industry. Id. The f i s t three-year phase of the proposed project would
"generate knowledge about display manufacturing and accelerate development of
new technologies." Don Clark, Pentagon Plans New Effort on Flat-Panel Displays,
S.F. CHRON.,Aug. 5, 1992, at B1, B12. The second phase might include financing
by DARPA to encourage U.S. companies to begin full-scale manufacturing. Id.
DARPA's current plan proposes spending $12 million of federal funds on the project in the first year. Proposed U S . Venture Would Try to Combat Japanese Lead
in Flat Panel Display Market, supra.
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participants in some type of government-industry consortium.86 Additional consortia in existing industries and in
promising new industries could potentially yield s i ~ i c a n t
benefits to U.S. industry and the U.S. economy.
Although private consortia may often succeed without
government assistance, some potentially successful consortia
may never even come into existence without government participation. Competitors within an industry often distrust each
other and are frequently reluctant to cooperate with one another.87 This distrustful attitude often impedes the formation of
an effective research consortium even when the consortium
promises to yield substantial benefits.88 Government participation may be of great importance in such situations because
in addition to providing financial incentives, government involvement lends credibility to the venture, lessens suspicion,
and helps increase the commitment of the individual memb e r ~ Government
.~~
involvement may also be important because of its "convening power," o r in other words, "its ability to
organize and sponsor or sanction the activity.*'

B. Manufacturing Extension Centers
The creation of manufacturing extension centers throughout the country is another program which could prove highly
beneficial to the health of U.S. manufacturing industries. Modeled after the highly successful agricultural extension centers,
the purpose of these centers would be to assist U.S. manufacturers, particularly small and medium-size manufacturers, in
applying the latest manufacturing and production technology.
A need for such centers certainly exists because manufacturing
capability is an area in which the United States trails its foreign competitors. As one observer notes, "[clompared with their
Japanese competitors, many of America's 357,000 manufacturing firms are stuck in a time warp today. . . . [A] combination
of inertia and high capital costs has kept many from adopting
improvements.*l
Burrows, supra note 66, at 47.
See CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET
OFFICE, U . S . CONGRESS, USINGR&D CONSORX-RAYLITHOGRAPHY, AND HIGH-RESOTIA FOR COMMERCIALINNOVATION: SEMATECH,
LUTION SYSTEMS 40 (1990).
88. See id.
89. See COMPETING IN MANUFACTURING, supra note 15, at 207, 209.
90. See CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET
OFFICE, supra note 87, at 12.
91. Susan Dentzer, Sharpening Our High-Tech Edge, U.S. NEWS& WORLD

86.
87.
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Small firms in particular find it difficult to keep up with
advancing manufacturing technology. These f m s ''offen lack
the capital, the tax incentives, the access to information, the
management strategies, and the training" necessary to effecSmall
~
tively apply advanced manufacturing t e c h n ~ l o g y . ~
firms also often lack the expertise necessary to determine
"what equipment best fits their needs, [and] how to use it effi~iently.'~~
Failure of small and medium-size manufacturers to keep
up with technological advances has nationwide economic implications. The failure to adopt advanced manufacturing techniques and equipment creates competitive problems for the
small firms as well as for the larger manufacturers who rely on
them for component^.^^ The lack of modern manufacturing
expertise also forces American companies with innovative ideas
to go overseas to manufacture their products.95 Unfortunately,
this translates into lost jobs and lower wages for American
workers.
One reason American companies have lagged behind their
Japanese counterparts in manufacturing is that the United
States devotes most of its research resources to basic scientific
.~~
to one
research as opposed to process t e ~ h n o l o g y "According
study, Japanese companies invest roughly 70% of their R&D in
process technology, whereas comparable US. companies invest

REP., Dec. 16, 1991, at 71, 73.
92.
Critical Technologies: Machine Tools, Robotics, and Manufacturing: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Technology and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on
Science, Space, and Technology, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1991) (statement of Leo
Reddy, President, National Coalition for Advanced Manufacturing).
93.
IN MANUFACTURING,
supra note 15, at 158.
COMPETING
94. See id. at 25.
95.
For example, even though Japanese labor rates are similar to U.S. rates,
LSI Logic decided to move its semiconductor wafer fabrication plant from the United States to Japan because factory productivity rates were two to four times higher in Japan than in the United States. Given this differential, the company felt
that it had no choice but to relocate its plant. Louise Kehoe, Cost Constraints
Prompt a Continental Shift: LSrs Decision to Close Its G e m n Plant Shows the
Problems Facing High-Tech Manufacturing in Europe, FIN. TIMES,Aug. 25, 1992, at
13.
96.
Process technology generally refers to the way that products are manufactured and brought to market. For example, improvements in the way that products
are manufactured may reduce the number of defects found in a manufactured
product or reduce the cost and time required to design and manufacture a new
product and bring it to market. Basic scientific research, on the other hand, focuses on developing new technologies which can lead to the creation of entirely new
products.
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about the same proportion in product R&D.'*7 As a result, although U S . companies are usually the leaders in developing
the technologies which lead t o new products, the Japanese
profit from the developments because of their superiority in
manufacturing and process technologies. The key to keeping a
manufacturing company successful in the global market today
depends less on major scientific breakthroughs and more on
"[clost-sensitive design, new process technologies, [and] manuManufacturing extension
facturing systems engi~~eering."~~
centers could help U.S. manufacturers improve their production
processes and hence the quality and reliability of their products. Significant gains could be achieved by helping "companies
to improve their ability t o use new process technologies such as
computer-aided design, computer-controlled machine tools, or
electronic data inter~hange."~~
Although there are consultants in the private sector which
specialize in helping manufacturers apply new technologies, the
availability of private sector assistance does not appear to have
been effective in helping small manufacturers. Small and
medium-size manufacturers hesitate to use private consultants
because they "don't trust their ability to find a consultant who
will tailor his advice to what the manufacturer needs rather
than what the consultant has t o sell."loOSome small firms also cite difficulties in obtaining competent help from private
consulting f m s , perhaps because " '[tlhe engineering service
consultants usually send out the new guys to small firms. ,7101
On the other hand, because state government extension services "are not trying to sell the companies anything or collect big
fees," small manufacturers are more likely to trust their objectivity and impartiality.lo2
The federal government and some state governments have
already made some limited efforts to promote the diffusion of
manufacturing technology. The federal government recently
established a technology extension program which provides for
six Manufacturing Technology Centers.lo3 Twenty-three .
7

97.

Lewis M. Branscomb, Does America Need a Technology Policy?, HARV.
BUS.

REV.,Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 24, 25.
98.
99.
100.
01.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. at 30.
COMPETINGIN MANUFACTURING, supm note 15, at 174.
Id. at 180 (quoting Gary Brooks, President, Brooks Manufacturing).
Id. at 179.
See id. at 26.
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states "are spending a total of $50 million a year supporting 27
technology extension center^."'^ Many state industrial extension centers have already demonstrated the value that such
programs can have for the nation's manufacturing industries.
"Georgia Institute of Technology, for example, has helped almost 3,000 companies over the past five years solve manufacturing-process problems."lo5 In Pennsylvania, a team of experts from a state-sponsored industrial extension center helped
Scheirer Machine Co. to "reorganize its shop floor and raise
productivity by about 15% in just six months. The center lent
Scheirer $150,000 a t 5% interest to buy a computerized lathe.
And the company will get ongoing assistance to upgrade its
technology further."lo6The services provided by the extension
centers are in such demand that some of the centers do not
"advertise for fear of attracting too much business."lo7
The existing state and federal programs are, however, still
very limited and underfunded. All of the programs combined
probably reach less than two percent of all small manufacturing
This effort is dwarfed by the Japanese, who
spend over $470 million supporting 185 technology extension
centers.lo9
The Office of Trade and Technology Assessment estimates
that the cost to run industrial extension programs in all states
would be about $480 mi1li0n.l'~However, the net cost to the
federal government for such a nationwide industrial extension
program is likely to be significantly less than the actual cost
because the government can expect to receive a return on its
investment. Improving the productivity and profitability of U.S.
manufacturers should help retain and create high-wage jobs in
the United States and thereby increase tax revenues.ll' This
104.
Christopher Farrell et al., Industrial Policy, BUS. WK., Apr. 6, 1992, at 70,
73.
105. Id. at 73.
106. Michael Schroeder, Small Business Has a Friend in Pennsylvania, Bus.
WK, Apr. 6, 1992, at 75, 75.
107.
IN MANUFACTURING,
supm note 15, at 183.
COMPETING
108. Id. at 18.
109. Id. The current amount spent for industrial extension services is also insignificant when compared with the Agricultural Extension Service, which receives
$1.2 billion (31% federal) in funding and has 4,650 scientific and technical staff. Id.
at 55. An increase in funding for industrial extension services would appear justified considering that "agriculture contributes 2 percent to the gross national product, and manufacturing 19 percent." Id.
110. Farrell et al., supra note 104, at 73.
111. This appears to be the case with agricultural extension programs.
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appears t o be the motivation for the states which have already
set up industrial extension programs. Their goal is to preserve
and develop "stable, high-paying factory jobs,"112 which in
turn strengthens their tax base.

C. Lower the Cost of Capital and Improve Tax Incentives
During the last decade, U.S. competitiveness was hindered
by the high cost of capital for US. companies compared to the
cost for their Japanese and many of their European counterp a r t ~ . ~Since
' ~ the decline of the Japanese stock market, the
cost of capital for Japanese companies has approached that of
U.S. companies. However, U.S. companies still face a competitive disadvantage in their ability to finance investment in
equipment and R&D due to the low U S . savings rate and unfavorable tax laws. Thus, one final element of a n effective American industrial policy would be to enact laws which would increase the U S . savings pool and encourage investment in high
technology and high value-added industries.
1. The low

U.S.savings rate

For the past several years, the US. savings rate has been
well below that of many of America's economic competitor^.^'^
Theoretically, a low domestic savings rate should not necessarily be detrimental to U.S. companies. Assuming that world
capital markets are completely open, U.S. companies should be
able to borrow from foreign lenders and investors at the same
rate as their foreign competitors. In theory then, U.S. companies should be at no disadvantage with reference to the avail-

Two studies have found high rates of return on investments in agricultural research, extension, and farmers' schooling. One study estimated internal rates of return (value of agricultural producthesearch and extension
expenditures) of 27 percent on such public investments in the State of
Virginia . . . . The other study found a social internal rate of return to
public crop research of 62 percent, and 15 percent to farmers' schooling.
COMPETINGM MANUFACTURING,
supra note 15, at 55 11.46 (citations omitted).
112. Schroeder, supra note 106, at 75.
113. James Flanigan, In Adversity, U.S. Finds New Strength, LA. TIMES, May
13, 1992, at Dl, D3. The cost of capital is defined as "the total cost of financing a
company through borrowing and issuing stock." Id.
114. The U.S. savings rate, which has recently averaged about 5.5% of GNP,
looks particularly bad when compared with the Japanese savings rate, which has
averaged around 18%. Decline of U.S. Semiconductor Infrastructure, supra note 32,
at 43 (statement of Robert N. Noyce, President, Sematech).
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ability and cost of capital. This theory, however, is seriously
flawed.l15 It assumes that the source or national origin of the
capital is irrelevant. Unfortunately, American competitiveness
is affected by the source of capital, especially in high technology industries.
In order to modernize their manufacturing facilities o r to
invest in a promising R&D project, companies are required to
raise large amounts of capital. Because U.S. capital is lacking,
companies are often forced to look to Japan for investment. In
1988, for example, twenty percent of all U S . semiconductor
equipment and materials suppliers who work with Sematech
had to get their expansion financing from Japanese sources.l16 Japan clearly has the capital to invest, as a result of its
huge trade surplus (a cumulative $400 billion with the United
States over the last decade).l17 However, in return for desperately needed Japanese capital, companies are at times forced to
make critical concessions to competitors or potential competitors. Often, a company must agree to share its technology or
grant a license in return for access t o Japanese capital.l18 As
a result, Japan is able to transfer many high value-added jobs
t o the Japanese economy.11g
Japanese companies have also used their pools of excess
capital to buy American high technology firms. The large number of acquisitions of American high technology companies by
Japanese f m s is alarming, to say the least. The Economic
Strategy Institute in Washington reported that between 1988
and 1991, Japanese companies accounted for 87 of 133 foreign
purchases of all or part of US. computer companies,

115. The cost of capital for American firms might be higher than for their foreign competitors even if they had equal access to capital from foreign lenders. Cost
of capital is influenced not only by "the cost of funds-interest rates or the cost of
equity''-but
also by other factors such as "corporate tax rates, the economic depreciation of the investment and its tax treatment, and other fiscal incentives for
investment." COMPETING IN MANUFAWRING, supra note 15, at 94. Thus, even if
the capital markets of all countries were open, and there is some evidence that
they are not, the cost of capital is likely to vary in different countries as a result
of differing tax and fiscal policies.
116. Decline of U.S. Semiconductor Infrastructure, supra note 32, at 43 (statement of Robert N. Noyce, President, Sematech).
117. Longworth, supra note 7, at 12.
NEWS,July 27,
118. See Jack Robertson, Yields on Joint Ventures, ELECTRONIC
1992, at 11, 11.
119. Decline of U.S. Semiconductor Infrastructure, supra note 32, at 43 (statement of Robert N. Noyce, President, Sematech).
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26 of 48 foreign investments in U.S. electronics firms, 48 of 53
investments in semiconductor companies, 27 of 37 investments in companies making semiconductor equipment, 30 of
59 telecommunications investments and 36 of 48 investments
in companies making advanced materials . . . . CIln at least
half these deals, the Japanese bought a majority ownership.lZ0

In contrast, it is extremely difficult for an American firm to
acquire a Japanese firm. "In 1990, there were 801 mergers and
acquisitions in Japan; only 10 involved foreign firms buying
Japanese f m s . In all 10 cases, it was a friendly acquisition in
a low tech business."121 The problem is not the amount of
Japanese investment, but rather the fact that the Japanese are
targeting specific high technology industries, and that the
technology flow in these industries is one-way from the United
States to Japan.lZ2The danger is that America's technological
advantage in many industries is being rapidly eroded as Japanese competitors cheaply acquire American technology in exchange for capital. The loss of technological advantage makes it
more difficult for other American firms to compete, and this in
turn results in lost market share, lost manufacturing base, lost
jobs and a higher trade deficit. This situation creates a vicious
circle. A large trade surplus with the United States gives the
Japanese a iarge pool of excess capital with which to acquire
U.S. companies and technology. This acquired technology in
turn helps the Japanese companies gain market share over
U.S. companies, thereby generating an even larger trade surplus. 123
To alleviate this problem, the U.S. savings rate must be
increased, thereby increasing the available pool of U.S. capital.
This objective may be accomplished in a number of ways.124A
broad-based tax on consumption would raise the savings rate
but would likely be so unpopular as to be politically infeasible.
Another possible solution is to give tax breaks for savings and

R.C. Longworth, Japanese Find Variety of Ways to Buy U.S. Ideas, CHI.
TRIB.,May 19, 1992, 5 1, at 1, 15.
121. Id.
122. See Robertson, supra note 118, at 11.
123. See Decline of U S . Semiconductor Infrastructure, supra note 32, at 38
(statement of Robert N. Noyce, President, Sematech).
124. A lengthy discussion of these alternatives is beyond the scope of this com120.

ment.
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investment. One often suggested method is to reduce or completely eliminate the capital gains tax for long-term investments of five to ten years or more. Most of America's competitors have very low or no capital gains tax1* To level the
playing field with these competitors, the U.S. capital gains tax
on long-term investments should be significantly lowered. Another possibility is t o expand existing savings programs such as
Individual Retirement Accounts by increasing the amount of
income that may be deducted and deferred, and by expanding
the class of individuals who are allowed to participate.
2. Unfavorable tax policies
American companies are also faced with a competitive
disadvantage with respect to their Japanese and European
competitors due to unfavorable laws relating to depreciation
schedules and credits for investment. The pace of innovation
and change is so great in high tech industries that firms have
to invest huge amounts of money just to keep up with the latest technology. The cost of constructing high tech manufacturing facilities is staggering and is expected to increase. The
Japanese are able to depreciate their high technology equipment investments in three years as opposed t o five years for
American companies.126 This makes investment much
cheaper and therefore more attractive to Japanese companie~.l~~
Changing the depreciation schedules to allow for a faster
write-off of high tech investments would more accurately reflect
the reality of the market because technology changes so quickly
that most high tech investments are actually obsolete in three
years.128 Allowing American companies t o depreciate their in-

Decline of U.S. Semiconductor Infrastructure, supra note 32, at 13 (stateof Michael P. Skarzynski, Assistant Secretary for Trade Development, Departof Commerce).
See Jack Robertson, Equipment Tar Break-Picking Up the Pieces, ELECTRONIC NEWS,Apr. 13, 1992, at 10, 10.
127. For example, one industry executive noted that " '[ilf Intel invests $1 billion
in new plant and equipment, it will pay $270 million more in taxes over five years
than a Japanese company will . . . . This is because the Japanese can write this
investment off over two or three years, while our write-off is five years.'"
Longworth, supra note 7, at 12 (quoting Michael Maibach, government affairs manager, Silicon Valley Co.).
128. See Semiconductors and the Electronics Industry, supra note 33, at 6
(statement of John A. Armstrong, Vice President for Science and Technology, IBM
Corp.).

125.
ment
ment
126.
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vestments in high technology equipment more rapidly would
encourage such investment and would allow American companies to compete more effectively with foreign rivals.
The government could also encourage investment in high
technology industries by restructuring the current R&D tax
credit. The government should fnst make the R&D tax credit
permanent. Because Congress never made the credit permanent, it must vote to reenact the tax credit every year. The
uncertainty regarding the future availability of the credit may
actually thwart a company's long-term investment plans.lm
Furthermore, to encourage investment in improving manufacturing processes and techniques, the credit should be extended
to process and engineering R&D in addition to product R&D.
The R&D credit should also be made available to "first
dollar" investments. In the current system, the credit only
applies to incremental increases in R&D spending over the
average spending during the base years 1984 to 1988.13' This
system fails to provide an adequate incentive for si@icant
R&D spending because the years 1984 to 1988 were "among
the most prosperous in U.S. manufacturing to date."131 As
one observer of the semiconductor industry has noted, the problem "is not one of an increment in R&D funding, the problem is
one of keeping the R&D funding even at a constant real
rate . . . . [Tlhe R&D tax credit only on the increment is not of
much use to the industry."132

IV. CONCLUSION
American industry has not performed particularly well
over the last ten to twenty years. America has seen the decline
of many important industries and is currently witnessing the
decline and destruction of several others. The U.S. manufacturing industry and infrastructure are vital to the health of the
overall American economy, including the service and technology
industries. Instead of watching passively as American manufacturing and support jobs are moved abroad, the federal govern-

129. Dentzer, supra note 91, at 75.
130. Manufacturers Urge 'Aggressive' Steps on Innovation, Call for R&D Credit,
ITC, DAILYREP.FOR EXECUTIVES
(BNA), Nov. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, DREXEC File.
131. Id.
132. Semiconductors and the Electronics Industry, supra note 33, at 6 (statement
of John A. Armstrong, Vice President for Science and Technology, IBM Corp.).
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ment should take a n active role in creating the conditions in
which American industry can flourish. Although the government need not pick winners and losers in the market, the government should assume the role of a partner with business
with the common goal of promoting economic prosperity. By
participating in research consortia in important industries,
establishing a network of manufacturing extension centers, and
providing incentives for greater savings and investment, the
government can help American industry gain a competitive
edge in the world market.

Steven C.Earl

